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ABSTRACT 
 
Notwithstanding the ambiguous research and productivity promoting effects of plant 
variety protections (PVPs), even in developed countries, many developing countries have 
adopted PVPs in the past few years to comply with their Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) obligations. Seeking and maintaining PVPs reserves 
options to an expected revenue stream from the future sale of protected varieties, the 
value of which varies for a host of reasons. In this paper we empirically examine the 
pattern of plant variety protection applications in China since its PVP laws were first 
introduced in 1997. We place those PVP rights in the context of China￿s present and 
likely future seed markets to identify the economic incentives and institutional aspects 
that influence decisions to develop and apply for varietal rights.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The development and spread of new and improved seed varieties has been the 
basis for productivity improvement in agriculture since crops were first domesticated 
about 10 millennia ago. For most of that time, new varieties were largely treated as 
common property, shared freely among farmers and countries and generating billions of 
dollars of benefits worldwide.
5 The era of free and unencumbered access to new crop 
varieties appears to be passing.  
Since the coming into force of the World Trade Organization￿s (WTO) Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement on January 1, 1995, 
120 countries lodged notifications of their compliance with all or part of the Agreement 
by late 2002 (WTO 2002).
6 Nonetheless, many of the world￿s poorer countries are yet to 
                                                 
1 Bonwoo Koo is a Research Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute 
2 Philip Pardey is a Professor in the Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota 
3 Keming Qian is Director of the Institute of Agricultural Economics  
4 Yi Zhang is a research associate in the International Cooperation Department, both of the Chinese 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) 
5 Nonetheless, a few countries sought to monopolize some genetic resources as described by Wright (1997). 
6 Developed countries were required to implement most provisions of TRIPS within one year of the 
Agreement taking affect. Developing countries were given a five-year period to comply while the least 
developed countries had 10 years to put the provisions in place, subject to review. Any country failing to 
enact and enforce the required forms of property protection is subject to trade sanctions under the 
reciprocity and trade settlement dispute clauses in the WTO Agreement. Even now, under national patent 
law, trading products with a country that is in violation of local forms of property protection makes the 
trade subject to sanctions and fines within that local jurisdiction (Binenbaum et al. 2003).  
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be TRIPS compliant, and the 30 least-developed WTO member countries have until 
January 2006 to become so.
7  
While many rich countries focused on the copyright, trademark, and the 
pharmaceutical patent aspects of the TRIPS Agreement, the intellectual property (IP) 
provisions concerning agricultural innovations, especially those involving crop varieties, 
were of special interest to developing countries. Under TRIPS, the status of plants as 
patentable subject matter is unclear and controversial. Moreover, members may exclude 
from patentability ￿plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and 
microbiological processes.￿
8 In fact, only the United States and a few other countries 
have opted so far to extend the scope of utility patents to encompass plants.
9 Protection of 
plant varieties, however, must still be provided ￿either by patents or by an effective sui 
generis system or by any combination thereof.￿
10 
Like many other countries, China has, at least for now, taken the sui generis route 
to TRIPS compliance, passing a plant variety protection law in 1997. At this early stage 
of its implementation, a substantial number of questions arise. What is the specific nature 
                                                 
7 The WTO distinguishes between developed, developing, transition and least-developed countries. 
Member countries declare for themselves if they are ￿developed￿ or ￿developing￿ subject to challenge of 
other WTO members. (There are 70 developing and transition country members as of January 2003.) Least-
developed countries are those countries so designated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). There are currently 49 least-developed countries on the UNCTAD list, 30 of 
whom are members of WTO. 
8 Article 27(3)(b) of TRIPS Agreement, which is currently being reviewed by members of the WTO. 
9 Henson-Apollonia (2002) estimates that by October 2002, there were 114 patents with claims to novel 
plants issued in the United States so far that year. 
10 Ibid. Plant varietal or breeders￿ rights are examples of so-called sui generis rights: that is, rights designed 
for a specific field of technology. These property rights are harmonized internationally through the UPOV 
(International Union for the Protection of New Plant Varieties) Convention. The number of UPOV 
members increased rapidly in the 1990s after the TRIPS Agreement came into force, from 20 members at 
the end of 1992 to 51 members by October 2002 (about half of whom are non-OECD countries).  
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of these intellectual property rights and the institutional arrangements in China to confer 
and protect them? To what extent are intellectual property rights on crop varieties being 
sought, and by whom? And what are the likely long-term effects of these rights on the 
amount, structure and conduct of agricultural R&D in China? Answers to these questions 
have potentially profound long-run consequences on the rate and direction of inventive 
activity in China￿s agriculture. While all of these questions are amenable to empirical 
investigation, unfortunately data are sparse, not least because the history of implementing 
varietal rights in most developing countries, including China, is short.
11 
Our intent here is to document the emergence and current status of plant varietal 
rights in China and assess their likely longer-term effects. We include, but go beyond, a 
consideration of the legal aspects of varietal rights in China to provide an empirical 
assessment of their extent and the institutional context that lay behind this form of 
property protection. An economic assessment of China￿s seed markets is also provided as 
a basis for investigating the incentives to seek and maintain varietal protection for new 
crop varieties. 
 
2.  ECONOMICS OF VARIETAL PROTECTION 
Establishing, maintaining and exercising varietal rights is an economic decision 
made by breeders of new varieties subject to intellectual property protection. Plant 
breeders will seek or maintain intellectual property protection if the expected rent from a 
variety exceeds the cost of securing and exercising the rights to that variety. If 
                                                 
11 Prior attempts to analyze the economic effects of PVP legislation deal mainly with the United States and 
include Perrin et al. (1983), Butler and Marion (1985), Knudson and Pray (1991), and Alston and Venner 
(2002). Diez (2002) analyzes the situation in Spain.  
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information on the future stream of revenues from selling a variety were complete, plant 
breeders would simply calculate the present value of the expected rent and the 
corresponding present value of the costs to make a one-time, up-front decision about 
securing and maintaining varietal rights.  
While the costs of gaining and securing plant variety protection are known with 
reasonable surety, the sequence of future returns from a varietal right is highly uncertain 
for many reasons. There are uncertainties about the size of the appropriable seed market 
for a given crop, the probability of commercial success of the protected variety, and the 
extent of enforcement of assigned property rights. Consequently, breeders typically make 
annual renewal decisions, preserving the right to pay renewal fees and exercise their 
exclusionary rights in future periods. Thus applying for (and subsequently renewing) 
PVP rights is a way of reserving the rights to potential future revenues, even if revenues 
in the short term are negligible. 
The expected value of holding plant variety rights consists of the current returns 
captured from the coming year and the option to renew the right in the subsequent year. If 
the right is not renewed, it lapses and the value of the variety to the breeder (but not 
necessarily others) is zero. Following Pakes (1986), the decision problem of a breeder to 
apply for or renew a varietal right at the beginning of the t
th period is expressed as 
  () m a x { 0 , () [ ( 1 )| () ] () } f o r 1 tr t E t I t c t t T Π= + β Π + − ≤ <  (1) 
 
where Π(t) is the expected discounted value of varietal protection at the beginning of the 
t
th period, r(t) is the return from the right during the coming t
th period, β is the discount 
factor, I(t) is the information held at time t about the appropriable revenues from  
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maintaining rights to the variety in the future, c(t) is the costs of reserving the 
exclusionary rights (i.e., the application fee or the subsequent costs of renewing and 
exercising ones exclusionary rights), and T is the statutory limit to PVP lives. If the total 
benefit from holding the varietal right (the sum of current returns and the discounted 
value of the option) is greater than the cost c(t), breeders will opt to apply for or renew 
varietal rights.
12 Option values are zero at the end of year T when the right expires.  
Plant breeders often apply for or renew protection even if the current return r(t) is 
negligible because they expect the potential revenue from the varietal right to be higher in 
future years. A distinguishing aspect of most PVP laws is the ￿breeders￿ exemption,￿ 
making it possible for others to use the protected variety in their own breeding programs 
and thus undermining the potential future revenue streams of the protected variety (as 
desired traits from the protected variety are incorporated into new and in some aspects, 
superior varieties). In contrast, it is an infringement subject to legally enforced penalties 
to use varieties protected by patents to breed new varieties, absent assignment of use 
rights by the patentee. Thus holders of PVP rights have less control and surety over the 
revenue streams realized from their rights than patent holders. 
The current return depends on the currently appropriable size of the seed market 
and the seed price premium of the protected variety over other varieties of the same crop. 
The option value placed on future revenue streams depends on the expected size of the 
appropriable seed market, the probability of successfully commercializing and 
appropriating rents from the protected variety, the rate of varietal obsolescence, and the 
                                                 
12 Generally, the option value from renewing varietal rights is non-negative and decreases over time as 
uncertainty regarding the appropriable stream of future revenues is reduced with better information. See 
Pakes (1986) for technical details.  
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discount rate. Varietal obsolescence has both biological and economic-cum-institutional 
dimensions. Biologically, varietal performance (in terms of pest or disease resistance as 
well as resilience to abiotic stresses) tends to deteriorate over time,
13 while the economic 
and institutional aspects of varietal obsolescence involve the extent of legal reuse of 
farmer saved seed and the illegal spread or piracy of reproduced versions of the protected 
seed and vary among geopolitical and legal jurisdictions. Varietal obsolescence (or, 
conversely, the superiority of the protected variety over others) affects both the size and 
longevity of the price premium commanded by the protected variety, while effectively 
enforced PVP rights determine the overall magnitude of the rents that can be appropriated 
by varietal right holders. 
 
3.  GENERATING, REGULATING, AND MARKETING IMPROVED SEED 
CHANGING R&D MARKETS
14 
Agricultural research in China has been and continues to be dominated by public 
agencies, staffed, operated, and largely financed by government.
15 Provincial institutes 
account for more than one-third of the government agencies and over half the public 
spending, with the remaining public expenditures almost evenly divided between national 
and prefectural institutes. Some private research is conducted by local and multinational 
firms, but is still embryonic. 
                                                 
13 This diminution in yield (or, more generally, productivity) performance may not occur uniformly in all 
locations, so the relative superiority of a variety can, and usually does, have strong agro-ecological 
determinants. 
14 Fan and Pardey (1992, 1997) describe developments in Chinese agricultural R&D through to the early 
1990s. Fan et al. (2003) and Huang et al. (2002) provide some details of the more recent developments. 
15 The amount of public research spending in China is significant in global terms, accounting for about 10 
percent of public agricultural R&D spending worldwide in the mid-1990s (Pardey and Beintema 2001).   
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As part of a broader effort to rein in government spending as well as encourage 
the development and commercialization of new technologies, the Chinese government 
launched a series of reforms concerning the funding and management of agricultural 
research in the mid-1980s. Public research institutes that hitherto relied solely on direct 
funding from government, almost entirely in the form of block grants, were now required 
to compete on a project-basis for some of their funding. They were also encouraged to 
raise some of their own revenues, giving rise to the establishment of ￿development firms￿ 
owned and operated by the respective research institutes. Initial efforts were fraught with 
management problems, exposed research institutes to potentially ruinous business risks, 
and often involved institute staff in undertakings only remotely related to research.
16 
Since the mid-1990s many public research agencies began more concerted efforts to 
exploit their research base to commercialize new technologies involving seeds, livestock 
vaccines, agricultural chemicals, machinery and so on. 
Some institutes have forsaken commercializing their own technologies via 
development firms, opting instead to focus on research and using others to bring their 
innovations to market, often on a contractual basis. Other institutes have evolved their 
commercial companies beyond in-house operations to limited liability shareholding 
companies, many times retaining controlling interests in these companies although some 
of the larger firms have recently been floated as public offerings to mobilize additional 
                                                 
16 For instance, the nationally recognized research institutes of Taihu and Lixiahe in Jiangsu province 
produced mineral water and set up a plant manufacturing auto spare parts, respectively. In 1988, the China 
National Rice Research Institute in Hangzhou launched a business to manufacture monosodium glutamate 
that lost more than 10 million yuan, saddling the institute with many legal battles as a result (Fan et al. 
2003).   
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capital.
17 The companies spun-off from public research institutes now compete against 
other agribusiness firms, mainly state-owned seed, food, agricultural, chemical and 
machinery enterprises facing similar, if not even more intense pressures to wean 
themselves from government funding. Some of the state-owned agencies have also 
become shareholding companies in their own right, and a few have even begun 
developing their own research capacities￿the beginnings of domestic private agricultural 
R&D in China.
18 The amount of R&D collectively conducted by these firms is not known 
with any precision but is thought to be comparatively small, perhaps less than 5 percent 
of total agricultural R&D. 
Although it appears technologies developed by foreign firms played a key role in 
promoting agricultural productivity in some sectors such as chemicals and machinery 
(Rozelle et al. 1999), their investment in locally conducted, seed-related research has 
been small, mainly because of constrained commercial seed markets, ineffectual 
intellectual property rights, and various government regulations. Monsanto and Delta and 
Pine Land established joint ventures with local operations but are only authorized to sell 
genetically modified (GM) cotton varieties in Hebei and Anhui provinces.
19 Pioneer Hi-
Bred International (now part of Dupont) began operations in China about a decade ago, 
opening a breeding station and then setting up a seed company in Northeastern China 
about five years ago to screen, adapt, and demonstrate maize and soybean varieties 
                                                 
17 For example, the seed company of the Institute of Vegetable and Flower (IVF) of the Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural Science established in 1990 takes promising hybrid vegetables lines developed by IVF and 
conducts varietal demonstrations targeted to various markets, then produces and markets the seed 
commercially.  Since 1990 the seed company has earned more than 10 million yuan annually, returning 90 
percent of its earnings to IVF, which in turn allocates 10 percent of this income to commercially successful 
breeders with the rest used to cover general research or operational costs (Fan et al. 2003). 
18 Government has selectively encouraged moves toward shareholding companies by way of exempting 
some firms from some taxes and providing low-interest loans. 
19 Notably, cotton is not included in the list of crops subject to PVP protection in China.  
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(although apparently with no commercial releases to date), while the Cha Thai Group 
from Thailand set up a joint venture in Hubei province to develop and market improved 
hybrid maize and rice varieties. However, these operations are hampered by government 
refusal to allow foreign firms and their local affiliates to directly compete with domestic 
seed companies in certain provinces. Foreign firms are also presently prohibited from 
importing and directly selling hybrid rice and maize seeds produced outside of China.
20 
However, indications are the government will continue liberalizing these markets, 
perhaps becoming fully WTO compliant in four to five years, after which local seed 
suppliers will be exposed to significant competitive pressure from foreign firms. The 
little local agricultural R&D done to date by multinational firms is limited to hybrid 
vegetable and sunflower seeds and genetically modified cotton. 
CHANGING SEED REGULATIONS AND MARKETS 
Developments in China￿s commercial seed market are inextricably intertwined 
with changes in the supporting R&D markets and regulations. Prior to the 1989 Seed 
Administration Regulation, agricultural seed markets were almost the sole purview of 
state-owned seed agencies. These seed agencies monopolized all seed-related operations, 
including seed testing, production, quality control, and the distribution of new seeds 
typically obtained free of charge from public research institutes. They were also 
responsible for administering seed regulations in their respective local jurisdictions, 
meaning that the structure of the Chinese seed market until the 1980s can be 
characterized as a series of regional monopolies under state government control.  
                                                 
20 Vegetable seeds can be imported and sold directly, as can hybrid maize and rice varieties developed 
outside China but bulked up within China. Presently, foreign firms can only operate as a minority partner 
with a Chinese controlled joint-venture firm.  
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Although the market is still dominated by state-owned seed companies, the 
general agricultural market reforms introduced during the 1980s along with the 1989 
Seed Administration Regulations significantly changed the market opportunities for input 
suppliers, including those producing and distributing seed, and began to erode the local 
monopoly positions held by the state agencies (Pray et al. 1998). First, the regulatory 
roles of the former seed agencies were separated from their seed business operations, 
which are now handled by state-owned seed companies or various other types of 
agribusiness firms. In addition, a plethora of private seed companies (usually small-scale 
family operations) restricted to selling vegetable seeds also emerged during the 1990s.
21 
The 1989 Seed Administration Regulations also gave legal status to the seed 
development firms emerging from the provincial, prefectural, and some national research 
institutes, although initially their roles were restricted. For example, seed development 
firms were initially restricted to selling the hybrid varieties of rice and maize developed 
by their respective research institutes. Many of these firms lacked sufficient land, 
expertise, and operating capital to economically produce and distribute their own seeds 
and thus relied on state-owned seed companies or large farms for these operations. This is 
still so, although the relationship between the research institutes and the state-owned seed 
companies is changing considerably. Notably, the state-owned seed companies no longer 
have generally free access to the new varieties emanating from the public institutes. As a 
result, some of the state-owned seed companies (and especially those operating at the 
county and township levels) have opted simply to produce commercial quantities of seed 
                                                 
21 We estimate there were around 2,700 state-owned seed companies in 2000, and about twice as many 
private (usually small-scale) seed companies.  
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on a contract basis, leaving the sale of that seed to others. Others, mainly but not 
exclusively operating at the provincial level, are specializing in seed marketing and 
distribution, and a few of the seed companies have also begun their own breeding 
programs. 
Market barriers were lowered even further with the implementation of the 2000 
Seed Law that supercedes the 1989 Seed Administration Regulation. The 2000 Seed Law 
involves no restrictions on the production of seeds other than a requirement for a license 
to produce hybrid maize and rice seed issued by a provincial or national agency.
22 Seed 
development firms or private seed companies can now compete with state-owned seed 
companies in many types of crops, and several firms have grown rapidly and command 
sizable market shares. This growth, including the merger or consolidation of various 
operations, has led to specialization among some firms (in terms of functions like seed 
production, marketing, or distribution) and the scale economies that brings, and 
restructuring and integration on the part of other firms seeking scale and scope 
economies.
23 Some of the bigger firms have become shareholding companies hoping to 
become more competitive with or engage in joint ventures involving multinational 
companies, thereby providing access to more advanced management skills and research 
capacity.
24 
                                                 
22 The intent of these licenses is to maintain seed quality, and so licenses are restricted to larger seed 
operations with in-house technical support. The provision of vegetable seed does not require a license. 
23 For instance, several years ago the Delong Group, with interests in machinery, financial services and 
telecommunications, began purchasing several state-owned seed companies in Anhui, Xinjiang, Shandong, 
and Inner Mongolia provinces, and in the process become one of the country￿s largest seed companies. 
24 For example, the Hunan Academy of Agricultural Sciences founded a seed company three years ago, 
Yuan Longping High-tech Agriculture Co. Ltd. (trading on the name of their renowned senior scientist, 
Yuan Longping, often called the ￿father of hybrid rice￿ in China), which purchased the seed distribution 
systems of several state-owned seed companies. This company has now evolved into a shareholding  
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4.  PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION IN CHINA 
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
Spurred by preparations for entry to the WTO, China began significantly revising 
its laws regarding patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other forms of intellectual 
property about a decade ago, including signing on to various international intellectual 
property conventions (Maskus and Dougherty 1998). Among the latest in a series of 
policy and legislative reforms affecting agriculture
25 and agricultural R&D in China over 
the past several decades is the extension of intellectual property rights to include 
agricultural innovations. China became a member state of the UPOV Convention on 
April 23, 1999 after enacting its ￿Regulations of the People￿s Republic of China on the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants￿ law (hereafter the PVP law) in March 1997. The 
law came into legal force on October 1, 1997 and PVP applications were accepted 
beginning April 1999. 
China￿s PVP law conforms to the 1978 Act of the UPOV Convention. Like 
similar laws implemented elsewhere, the Chinese PVP law grants protection to varieties 
that are new, distinct, uniform and stable.
26 Holders of a PVP certificate have the legal 
right to exclude others from commercializing protected varieties for a prescribed length 
of time: 20 years since the date of grant for vines, forest trees, fruit trees, and ornamental 
                                                                                                                                                 
company, and moved well beyond its initial focus on hybrid rice to specialize on pepper seed which 
presently accounts for the preponderance of the firm￿s income. 
25 Perkins (1988), Sicular (1988), Lin (1990), and Fan et al. (2003) provide perspectives on the considerable 
policy changes affecting Chinese agriculture, beginning with the moves to de-collectivize production 
initiated in late 1978. 
26 More specifically, to qualify for PVP protection in China a variety must be part of the botanical genera 
and species in the national list of protected varieties, not have been sold prior to the filing date of the 
application, be noticeably distinguishable from other known varieties, be uniform in relevant features or 
characteristics after propagation, breed true to type after repeated propagation, and have an adequate 
denomination (i.e., complies with compulsory seed certification and registration requirements).  
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plants, and 15 years for all other plants, including food, oil and fiber crops. Exceptions to 
the exclusionary rights are made, however, for both breeding and other scientific research 
(breeders￿ exemption) and for the use of seeds saved by farmers for replanting (farmers￿ 
exemption). 
Two separate administrative authorities implement China￿s plant variety 
protection laws. The State Forestry Administration is responsible for forestry including 
forest trees, bamboo, woody plants and dry fruit trees, while the Ministry of Agriculture 
is responsible for all agricultural plants, including grains, vegetables, edible fungi, and 
grasses. On April 27, 2000, the State Forest Administration published its first and so far 
only ￿Gazette for Protection of New Varieties of Plants (Forestry),￿ which included 
information on 13 PVP applications for forest trees. Since then information on the 
applications for and granting of these PVP rights are scattered throughout various 
journals and newspapers.
27 In contrast, the Ministry of Agriculture has published a 
￿Variety Protection Gazette for Agricultural Plants￿ on a bi-monthly basis since April 
1999.
28 This study deals with the protection of agricultural plant varieties, drawing on 
data compiled from various issues of the Ministry of Agriculture￿s PVP Gazette. 
Upon receiving an application, the relevant authority is required by law to 
complete a preliminary examination within six months. If an application is then deemed 
acceptable, information such as the date of application, crop type, description of the 
variety for which protection is sought, and the names of the applicants are published in 
                                                 
27 By early 2002, about 190 applications were filed for the varietal protection for forest trees, of which 48 
applications were granted (Faji Huang, Deputy Director of the PVP Office for Forest, personal 
communication). 
28 In July 2000, the gazette was renamed from ￿Plant Variety Protection Gazette￿ to ￿Variety Protection 
Gazette for Agricultural Plants,￿ hereafter called the PVP Gazette.  
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the PVP Gazette. For those applications passing preliminary examination, the authority 
conducts a substantive examination of the distinctness, uniformity, and stability of the 
variety in question. The granted rights prevail from the date of issuance of the PVP 
certificate, and like PVP laws prevailing in many other countries, each new right pertains 
to a single new variety. 
Administrative procedures for protecting agricultural plants are handled by the 
Office of Variety Protection for Agricultural Plants within the Ministry of Agriculture. In 
early 2002, the office had a total of 12 full-time employees handling basic assessment 
and administrative tasks, with four staff involved in pre-examination activities and the 
rest engaged in testing and substantive examination.
29 The office devolves most of its 
biological evaluation to various testing centers, one main center located in Beijing plus 
14 other testing sites scattered throughout the main agricultural areas of China. Other 
procedures such as rejection of application, denomination of new varieties, and re-
examination of applications are handled by an ad-hoc committee, the Plant Variety Re-
examination Committee, which is convened when needed by senior administrators of the 
Ministry of Agriculture (Chen 2002). 
Once a PVP certificate is issued, the right holder is required to pay a series of 
annual fees over the period of protection to maintain the rights. The 1999 fee schedule 
administered by the Ministry of Agriculture (Table 1) is still the applicable fee schedule 
for agricultural plants. Establishing and maintaining protection for a full 15 years costs  
                                                 
29 By way of comparison, in 2001, the PVP office of the United States employed 12 staff, including a 
commissioner, 9 examiners and 2 support staff.  
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the right holder 47,089 yuan or US$5,687 for each plant variety right granted (excluding 
the administrative and other costs of submitting an application). More than 85 percent of 
the total fee is for maintaining the right. Establishing and maintaining PVP rights in 
China is costly, even by rich country standards.  For example, PVP fees in the United 
States totaled US$2,450 per variety (including a $300 application fee and a $2,150 
examination fee) in 1999 and there is no annual maintenance fee.
30 
 
Table 1--Costs of establishing and maintaining plant variety rights in China 
U.S. dollars
 
Fees Chinese  yuan         Official market
       exchange rate
a 
   Purchasing power
   parity rate
b 
Establishing Rights   
 Application  fee  1,800  217  994 
 Examination  fee  4,600  556  2,541 
Maintaining Rights     
     ( cost per year) 
   Years  1-3  1,500  181  829 
   Years  4-6  1,950  236  1,077 
   Years  7-9  2,535  306  1,401 
   Years  10-12  3,295  398  1,820 
   Years  13-15  4,283  517  2,366 
    Years 16-18  5,567  672   3,076 
   Years  19-20  7,237  874  3,998 
  Total maintenance fee (15 years)  40,689  4,914  22,480 
  Total maintenance fee (20 years)  71,864  8,679  39,704 
Total cost       
 Agricultural  plants 
(15 years of protection)  
47,089 5,687  26,016 
  Forestry (20 years of protection)   78,264 9,452  43,240 
Source: China Ministry of Agriculture (1999) 
a. The 1999 exchange rate used here was US$1 = 8.28 yuan. 
b. The 1999 purchasing power parity rate is US$1 = 1.81 yuan World Bank (2001). 
                                                 
30 Similarly, Brazil charges US$348 to establish PVP rights and US$2,609 to maintain these rights for 15 
years (Koo et al. 2003).   
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Given the substantial differences in price levels between the United States and 
China, purchasing power parities (PPPs) instead of market exchange rates provide an 
alternative and somewhat more realistic basis for comparing PVP costs internationally. 
Using PPPs to denominate costs in terms of international dollars (rather than the U.S. 
dollars obtained when market exchange rates are used), the total cost of establishing and 
maintaining PVP rights in China for a single variety for 15 years is $26,010 in 1999 
prices (Table 1, right-hand column). This is almost five times more than the 
corresponding costs when using official market exchange rates to convert currencies, and 
more than ten times the corresponding costs in the United States. Although insufficient 
time has elapsed to examine the renewal behavior of rights holders, the exceptionally 
high maintenance costs suggest that right holders in China will maintain their rights only 
if significant revenue is expected from the protection in the future. 
THE PATTERN OF VARIETAL PROTECTION 
A total of 492 PVP applications for agricultural plants were lodged and published 
in the PVP Gazette through September 2002. Figure 1 shows the number of PVP rights 
sought and granted on a monthly basis from April 1999 (when the first application was 
lodged) to May 2002 (the last published application for which we have data). An average 
of 13 applications were made monthly, but with substantial variation around the average 
and indications of an upward trend over time. The initial spike of 49 applications in April 
1999 most likely reflects the latent demand for varietal rights for material developed prior 
to the implementation of the PVP law. The reported reduction in the number of 
applications in early 2002 may be more apparent than real, reflecting lags between the  
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date of application and its publication (which averaged about 6 months in our sample). 
Only 128 PVP rights, about 26 percent of the total of 492 applications, were granted by 
September 2002. Almost half the applications lodged in 1999 are yet to be granted, 
although some may have been rejected or withdrawn in the interim.
31 The average grant 
lag for granted applications is about 17 months from the date of application. 
                                                 
31 By way of comparison, during the period from January 1971 to December 2001, a total of 7,199 PVP 
applications were made in the United States, of which 4,960 certificates were granted for more than 190 
crops.  
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Based on an assessment of the early wave of PVP applications, Tong (2002) 
argued that the number of applications in China was limited because of a lack of 
appreciation of the role of property rights in a market economy, the high cost of gaining 
protection, the uncertain scope of protection, and complicated and costly enforcement 
processes. Some of these concerns are supported by our data, others are moot given the 
rapid changes afoot in the Chinese seed sector and some are questionable. In particular, 
the basic premise that the initial number of PVP applications was unduly constrained by 
Chinese-specific factors is debatable and the number is not out of line with the historical 
experience in the United States. Although there were an average of 347 PVP applications 
per year in the United States during the past ten years, there were only 121 applications 
per year for the decade following the passage of the U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act in 
1970 (compared with 156 per year for China). 
Plant variety rights were sought for 15 different crops since 1999, and the number 
of crops for which varietal protection was sought has increased over time (Table 2).
32 
Applications were lodged for only 5 crops during the first 13 months of our sample, and 
for 12 crops during the last 12 months, reflecting in part the expanded number of crops 
eligible for protection. About 61 percent of the total number of applications was for 
maize, followed by rice (21 percent), wheat (4 percent), and soybean (3 percent). Most 
applications are made to protect grain crops, with the share of applications for vegetable 
and fruit crops being less than 5 percent. Perhaps surprisingly, the preponderance of the 
protection sought is for hybrid, not open-pollinated, maize and rice varieties, including 
                                                 
32 In September 1999 a total of 10 species were eligible for protection, growing to 30 species by March 
2002 (including 5 major cereals, 2 oil crops, 2 roots and tubers, 10 vegetables and fruits and 11 flowers and 
grasses).  
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both the inbred lines and the final hybrid seed. The institutional arrangements for 
producing finished seed and the state of legal recourse for piracy may account for this 
apparent anomaly. The common practice in China is for research institutes or seed 
development firms to outsource the production of commercial quantities of seed, often to 
state-owned seed companies who in turn contract with individual growers to produce the 
seed. Under these circumstances, the technology owner (i.e., seed development firm or 
research institute) runs the real risk of piracy or theft of its hybrid seed and even its in-
bred lines, so that plant variety protection certificates provide an additional legal avenue 
of recourse beyond that offered by contract law.  
 
21
Table 2--PVP applications by crop 
Number of applications    
Crop 
  
First 13 months 
of sample
a 
Middle 13 
months of 
sample
a 
Last 12 months 
of sample
a  Total   
 
Share of total
   ( count)     (percent) 
Maize           
 Hybrid  77  71  62  210    43 
 Non-hybrid  39  35  15  89    18 
Rice           
 Hybrid  13  25  36  74    15 
  Non-hybrid  5 17 8  30    6 
Wheat 0  5  14  19    4 
Soybean 0 16 1  17    3 
Cabbage  4 1 5  10    2 
Rapeseed  0 3 7  10    2 
Pepper  0 7 2  9    2 
Peanut  0 3 4  7    1 
Pear  0 2 5  7    1 
Potato  1 2 0  3    1 
Others
b 1 2 4  7    1 
Total  140 189 163  492    100 
Source: Compiled by authors from China Ministry of Agriculture (various issues) 
a. The first thirteen month of the sample includes April 1999 ￿ April 2000; the middle 13 month, May 2000 
￿ May 2001; the last 12 month, June 2001 ￿ May 2002. 
b. Others include pink flower (2), watermelon (2), tomato (1), garden sorrel (1), and an ornamental flower 
(1). 
 
By way of comparison, state trade secret laws in the United States effectively 
protect the theft of hybrid in-bred lines. For example, in 1994 Holden Foundation Seeds 
were judged liable for misappropriating Pioneer Hi-Bred￿s in-bred hybrid corn lines 
under Iowa trade secret law. They were ordered to pay $46 million to Pioneer Hi-Bred  
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International, an estimate of the profits forgone by illegal use of these in-bred lines.
33 
Utility patents provide an additional means of protecting in-bred lines in the United 
States. As a consequence, the share of hybrid varieties for which plant variety protection 
is sought is very small in the United States. Among the more than 190 crops for which 
PVP protection was sought during the past 30 years in the United States, open pollinated 
crops accounted for the lion￿s share of applications. For example, soybeans accounted for 
1,022 applications (20 percent of the total) and wheat for 472 (10 percent) of the 
applications. Only 12 percent of the total applications were for corn varieties. 
The majority of PVP applications (72 percent of the total) were filed by national, 
provincial, and prefectural public research institutes and universities (Table 3). Among 
these institutes, more than half the applications were made by provincial institutes, nearly 
one-third by prefectural institutes, 12 percent by universities, and only one percent by 
national research agencies such as the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
(CAAS). These institutional shares are roughly consistent with the corresponding shares 
of overall investments in agricultural research. Both publicly-held seed development 
firms and state-owned seed companies accounted for about 10 percent of the applications, 
with another 14 percent made by the shareholding companies spun off from these firms. 
The demarcation between the public and private sectors in China is sometimes difficult to 
discern, but we estimate that 82 percent of the PVP applications are lodged by public 
agencies (i.e., excluding shareholding companies). This contrasts markedly with the 
United States where the public-sector share of PVP applications is only 15 percent. 
                                                 
33 Pioneer Hi-Bred International. v. Holden Found. Seeds, 35 F.3d 1226, 1240 (8th Cir. 1994). See Goss 
(1996) for more details.  
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Notably, multinational companies accounted for few filings in China (two for potatoes, 
one for pepper, and one for an ornamental flower), a reflection of restrictive government 
regulations. 
Table 3--Plant variety protection by type of applicant
a 
Type of applicants
b 
Number of 
applications  Share of total 
  (count) (percent) 
Public research institution     
 National  4  1 
 Provincial  189  38 
 Prefectural  116  24 
 University  43  9 
Seed development firm (by research institute)  14  3 
State-owned seed company (agribusiness firm)  34  7 
Shareholding company  72  15 
Multinational 4  1 
Individual 13  3 
Others (foreigners)  3  1 
Total 492  100 
Source: Compiled by authors from China Ministry of Agriculture (various issues) 
a. Joint applications (a total of 45) are assigned according to the name of the first applicant. 
b. This classification structure taken from Fan et at. (2003). 
  
Table 4 gives more detail regarding individual applications and the crops 
involved. More than 120 different applicants applied for protection during the sample 
period, but the distribution is highly skewed toward a few applicants. Just 10 applicants 
account for more than 40 percent of the total applications￿13 percent were made by the 
Jilin Academy of Agricultural Science (AAS), 5 percent by Laizhou AAS, 4 percent by 
Dandong AAS, and 3 percent by Sichuan AAS. A further 20 percent of the total 
applications were lodged by 74 applicants who each filed less than 2 claims.  
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Interestingly, institutions located in just five of China￿s 31 provinces (Jilin, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Sichuan, and Henan) accounted for more than 55 percent of the total number 
of applications. 
Table 4--PVP applications by applicant and type of crop 
Applications  Crop 
Applicant  
Share Number Maize Rice
Whea
t 
Soybea
n 
Cabbag
e 
Pean
ut 
Others
b 
  (percent) (count) (count) 
Jilin AAS
a  13 62  49  2    11       
Laizhou AAS  5  24  21        3     
Dandong  AAS  4  18  16  2         
Sichuan  AAS  3  17  3  14         
Chengde Greatwall Seed Ltd.  3  15  15             
Henan AAS  3  13  6    2    4  1   
Hunan  AAS  3  13    9        4 
Shandong Denghai Seed Ltd.  3  13  13             
Jiangsu AAS  2  12  4  7  1         
Sichuan Agricultural 
University  2 11  3  7  1        
China Agricultural 
University
  2  9  9           
Heilongjiang  AAS  1  8  8           
Other applicants  58  277  152  63  15  6  3  6  32 
Total  100 492  299  104 19  17  10  7  36 
Source: Compiled by authors from China Ministry of Agriculture (various issues) 
a. AAS denotes Academy of Agricultural Science.  
b. Others include rapeseed (10), pepper (9), pear (7), potato (3), pink flower (2), watermelon (2) tomato (1), 
garden sorrel (1), and ornamental flower (1) 
 
 
While there is a reasonably close correspondence between the patterns of overall 
R&D spending and PVP applications, the links between research and the intellectual 
property sought by an individual research institute is less clear-cut. The Jilin AAS is a 
relatively large provincial research institute with a total of 1,055 staff in 2000 (including  
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404 scientific researchers) focusing on maize and soybean research. Sichuan AAS and 
Jiangsu AAS are also large institutes, comparable to Jilin AAS, with 1,530 and 1,200 
staff respectively, and an emphasis on rice, cotton, and wheat research. Not surprisingly, 
these three institutes sought significant numbers of PVP certificates and the crop 
orientation of their PVP applications aligns with their respective research emphases. 
What is surprising is that some smaller research institutes like Laizhou AAS (a 
prefectural institute in Shandong province with 380 staff engaged heavily in maize 
breeding) and Dandong AAS (a similarly sized prefectural institute in Liaoning province) 
also sought varietal rights comparable in number to the larger institutes mentioned above. 
At the other extreme is the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science (CAAS), a national 
institute with a large staff (about 9,000, split evenly between scientists and support staff) 
and a research budget of about $35 million in 2001, which sought only 4 PVP certificates 
through to May 2002.
34 
Financial factors seem relevant regarding the decision to apply for PVP 
protection. The comparatively large number of PVP applications from financially 
strapped agencies such as Heilongjiang AAS, Dandong AAS, and Laizhou AAS are 
indicative of their interest in reaping the potential rewards from commercializing their 
technologies. Other institutes with comparatively abundant resources, like CAAS, have 
made less effort to protect varieties for revenue raising purposes. Moreover, commercial 
                                                 
34 In late 2002 CAAS began implementing a radical restructuring program that will take several years to 
complete. The intent is to reduce staff on core government support to 2,800 (down from the current 9,000) 
without a commensurate reduction in funding so that salaries can rise sufficiently to retain and recruit good 
scientists, and to remove excess support personnel and less productive scientific staff. Those staff not 
supported by government, are to be paid from revenue earning operations run by CAAS or retired, although 
in the later case the lack of a national social security program means that CAAS is saddled with paying all 
retirement costs.  
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successes prior to the passage of the PVP Law in 1999 may account for the application 
behavior of some institutes. For example, the commercial success of the ￿Yedan￿ series 
of hybrid maize seeds developed by Li Denghai, now president of Laizhou AAS, might 
have stimulated subsequent PVP application by the institute. Personal traits can also be 
important in understanding the pattern of applications: the presidents of Jilin AAS and 
Laizhou AAS are known to be well versed in intellectual property matters and attuned to 
the commercialization prospects of new technologies. However, the most important 
factor may be the overly optimistic expectation of breeders or research administrators 
about the appropriable size of the Chinese seed market, as analyzed below. 
 
ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF CHINA￿S PVP APPLICATIONS 
The current and expected size of commercial seed markets in China is both 
affected by and provides incentives for generating, acquiring, and maintaining intellectual 
property rights over seeds. Decisions to establish and protect intellectual property involve 
economic choices about the costs and benefits of doing so. As demonstrated above, PVPs 
in China are especially costly, even by developed-country standards. Expectations about 
the future size of commercial seed markets in China and the appropriability of rents in 
relation to those future markets circumscribe the PVP costs that rights holders are likely 
to incur. Crops for which the propensity to use saved or informally (often farmer to 
farmer) exchanged seed is high and likely to persist provide few opportunities to recoup 
the cost of developing and protecting property rights to new seed varieties. Higher valued 
crops and those with significant market transactions give a greater incentive to acquire 
and maintain the rights to new varieties.   
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According to ISF (2002), worldwide seed sales are US$30 billion, of which 
China￿s domestic market accounts for about 10 percent. The basis for these figures is not 
revealed, nor are crop specific values reported. Thus, combining data obtained from 
publicly available databases with additional information gained from numerous 
interviews of those engaged in or familiar with Chinese seed markets, we estimated the 
size of the commercial seed market for 14 principal crops (and additionally hybrid and 
non-hybrid varieties for four of those crops) (Table 5). Present values of the future sale of 
seed are then used to investigate the incentives to develop and protect new seeds in 
commercially important segments of the Chinese market. 
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Total seed consumption by farmers for important crops and vegetables is reported 
in column 3, obtained by multiplying the area sown for each crop (column 2) by its 
average sowing rate (column 1). This represents the total seed planted, irrespective of its 
source. For many non-hybrid crops farmers save seeds for use in subsequent plantings so 
only a fraction of the seed consumed is traded in commercial markets.
35 Column 4 gives 
the consensus estimates we obtained of the rate of seed replacement, defined here as the 
proportion of sown seed purchased through commercial markets.
36 Seed replacements 
rates, seed consumption and average prices were then used to estimate the value of 
China￿s commercial seed market for selective crops in local (column 6) and U.S. dollar 
(column 7) units. 
The total value of commercial seed sales in 2000 for the 14 crops in table 5 is 
about US$2.3 billion, including $1.5 billion for the 7 major food crops we valued, $0.6 
billion for vegetable and fruit crops, and $0.2 billion for oil and other crops. In 2000, the 
area cropped for agriculture totaled 156.3 million hectares, of which 108.4 million 
hectares were for food crops, 15.2 million for vegetables and fruits, and the rest for 
rapeseed and other oil crops, cotton, tea, and so on (China National Bureau of Statistics 
2001). The crops included in table 5 accounts for about 90 percent of the total area sown 
to food crops, 50 percent of the area in vegetables and fruits, and 35 percent of the area in 
other crops. Using the respective area shares to recalibrate the crop seed values directly 
                                                 
35 For our baseline estimates in table 5 we took the extent of informal seed exchange among farmers to be 
negligible, thus these estimates represent an upper-bound indication of the current value of the commercial 
seed market in China. 
36 Hybrid varieties of corn, rice, and vegetables have comparatively high seed replacement rates (almost 
100 percent), whereas self-pollinated crops such as wheat and millet have lower rates, deemed to be in the 
20 to 30 percent range in 2000.  
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estimated in table 5, we figure the value of the Chinese seed market for all agricultural 
crops in 2000 was about US$3.4 billion (or 28.7 billion yuan). 
Plant breeders base their decisions on whether to develop and protect new 
varieties on the present and expected future size of the appropriable commercial seed 
market. If the present value of the expected return from the variety exceeds the present 
value of the cost of R&D and IP protection, then breeders will opt to invest in varietal 
development. Expanding on the reduced form of the decision problem described by 
equation (1), the present value of benefits from developing and protecting a 
representative crop variety can be expressed as 
     ( ) ( , , , ) d PV f Q Π =∆ ρ β     (2). 
The quantity of seed demanded, Qd, is itself a function of the average share of 
sown area for each variety, the seed sowing rate per hectare, and the rate of seed 
replacement per season per crop. The seed price premium, ∆, paid for improved seed over 
the price of current varieties depends both on the quality of the seed, which affects the 
potential size of the price premium, and the strength of intellectual property rights, which 
affects the share of the potential premium appropriable by the breeder. Well-enforced 
property rights limit the scope of illegal reproduction and sale of protected seed so that a 
larger share of the potential price premium accrues to breeders. The probability of 
commercial success of the variety, ρ, depends both on the productive quality of the seed 
and market structure aspect that effect the intensity of competition in a given locale for a 
given crop. The effective commercial life of the variety is affected by the rate of release 
of competing varieties and the rate of biological obsolescence, while the discount factor β 
affects the size of the present value of the benefit stream.  
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The inherent uncertainty of estimating future benefit streams compounded by the 
lack of relevant data makes estimating the present value of the expected return 
problematic. Nonetheless, we compiled sufficient information to develop order-of-
magnitude estimates of these present values for representative varieties of maize, rice, 
wheat, soybean, and potato for China (Table 6). The intent here is to demonstrate how 
variations in the strength of property protection￿i.e., the degree of appropriability of the 
price premium and the effective life of the varietal rights￿affect the incentive to develop 
and protect improved varieties, and to compare the economically rational number of 
PVPs with the actual number of PVPs sought over a recent 12 month period.
37  
 
                                                 
37 Building on the estimates provided in table 5, the results in table 6 assume that the representative variety 
for each crop included occupies 1 percent of the total sown area for each crop; there is a 2 percent reduction 
per year in this sowing rate due to improvement of seed quality over time; the probability of research 
success is one percent; the present value of research costs for each variety is 10,000 yuan; the effective life 
of a variety is 7 years; and discount rate is 6 percent (i.e., β = 0.95). In addition, we assumed that farmers￿ 
rate of seed replacement and the area sown to each crop are constant over time. Costs include only the 
government charges and exclude the private costs of preparing PVP submission and exercising 
exclusionary rights.  
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Table 6 gives an indication of the likely present values of the returns accruing to 
Chinese breeders of a representative maize, rice, wheat, soybean, and potato variety 
based on our best estimates of the future value of the respective seed markets in China 
(from table 5) and the institutional and IP realities facing crop breeders (see footnote 33 
for details). Here we analyze the effects of different intellectual property regimes by 
simulating a range of returns to breeders based on variations in varietal protection. The 
upper panel involves a set of simulations in which returns are appropriated for only 7 
years or the legal limit of the right (15 years), while the appropriable price premium 
varies from 100 percent of the average price in table 5 for ￿strong￿ rights to 10 percent 
for ￿weak￿ rights (plus an intermediate case when the premium equals 50 percent of the 
average price). The central panel gives an indication of the present value of the cost of 
developing and protecting a new variety under different IP regimes and under the U.S. 
cost structure with no annual maintenance fee. For each of these IP and cost regimes, the 
bottom panel of table 6 provides an estimate of the number of varieties for which IP 
protection makes economic sense.  
Comparing among crops, it is clear that market size is an important determinate of 
the economically rational extent of intellectual property protection. Given the costs of 
varietal development and protection, the comparatively small size of the Chinese market 
for potato seed provides little incentive to protect new potato varieties presuming the 
current low rate of commercial seed replacement persists. Conversely, with plausible 
assumptions regarding the effective life of a varietal right (see lower panel of table 6), it 
makes economic sense to protect upwards of 124 new varieties of hybrid corn each year. 
The economic extent of protection is also sensitive to the price premium appropriated by  
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breeders; a tenfold increase in the premium (comparing weak versus strong rights) results 
in a proportionate increase in the number of varietal rights.  
Because the costs of maintaining varietal rights in China increases along with the 
benefits as the varietal life lengthens, the economic extent of protection is less sensitive 
to variations in the life of the right than changes in the price premium appropriated by 
breeders. In fact, lengthening the effective life of varietal rights in China (comparing the 
results of 7- to 15-year lives) marginally increases the number of varieties for which 
protection is economically justified. Indeed if China were to adopt a U.S. style cost 
profile by eliminating its annual maintenance fee, the present value of IP costs are 
diminished relative to the costs of research such that the economic number of protected 
varieties increases substantially. In table 6, for example, the number of hybrid maize 
varieties for which protection is rationally sought increases from 124 to 206 varieties per 
year under a strong IP regime if a U.S. cost structure were adopted. Clearly this result is 
especially sensitive to assumptions about the costs of research. Finally, a comparison of 
our simulation results with the actual extent of protection are consistent with the notion 
that breeders perceive that China￿s IP regimes give more protection (or are likely to do so 
in the future) than the institutional evidence suggests is currently the case.
38 
                                                 
38 Alternatively it could be that crop breeders in China expect the overall value of domestic seed markets to 
grow substantially larger than we predicted when forming these estimates.  
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5.  CONCLUSION 
Keeping with the general structure of research in China, public agencies account 
for the majority of total PVP applications (more than 80 percent), in contrast to the 
situation in the United States where more than 85 percent of the applicants are private 
firms. Given its longer history, the institutional interest in PVP protection is naturally 
much greater in the United States (with more than 600 entities applying for protection 
since 1971) than China (with about 120 entities seeking protection), although the pattern 
of institutional protection is similar. In both countries, the top 5 applicants account for 
about one-third of the total number of applications, with the remaining applications being 
lodged by a large number of other entities. 
In line with the general patent literature (as surveyed by Jaffe 2000 and Gallini 
2002), we find that the economically rational extent of PVP protection in China is more 
sensitive to appropriability conditions in a given year (analogous to the ￿scope￿ of 
protection) than the extent of appropriability over time (i.e., the length of protection). In 
part, this stems from the structure of PVP protection in China that requires the payment 
of annual fees that increase with time to maintain options over varietal rights, in an 
analogous way to the structure of patent costs generally. In contrast, the structure of PVP 
costs in the United States requires an up-front payment with no recurring maintenance 
fees. We demonstrate that if China adopted the U.S. pattern of PVP costs, the economic 
extent of protection would expand considerably. However, this result is sensitive to a 
number of assumptions, not least those regarding the present value of the costs to develop 
new varieties versus the costs of protecting the intellectual property embodied in them.  
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